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I: 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OF THE 
EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE INFERENCES ABOUT HOW 
LONG THE DANGEROUS CONDITION EXISTED 
This case is about whether a bar that protruded above the grass after it was installed 
in 2006 as part of Herriman 's pennanent lighting infrastructure is a dangerous condition. 
Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest argue that the bar was safe when it was installed in 2006, but 
that it inexplicably morphed into a hazard shortly before Ms. Cochegms' injury in 2012. 
Moreover, they argue that it was not dangerous for a long enough period of time for 
~ Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest to have constmctive knowledge ofits existence. The evidence 
proves that the bar existed long enough for Rosecrest, FCS and Herriman to have 
constructive notice of the dangerous condition: 
A. The trial court found that the bar "may have existed yesterday, it may have 
existed for years." 1 This fact alone requires the Court to make two reasonable 
inferences: first, copper grounding rods do not suddenly appear out of 
nowhere; second, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Cochegms, 
the bar likely existed as a dangerous condition for years. 
1R. 730 
4 
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B. The bar had been impacted by a lawnmower. Adam Jones and Monte Johnson 
both testified that the cuts were likely caused by a lawnmower. 2 The rod was 
also oxidized. 3 
C. Specifically, Mr. Cochegrus testified that he examined the bar in the "near 
future"4 after Ms. Cochegrus was injured. 5 He stated that it appeared rusted 
and that it had been hit by a blade or "something."6 
D. Ms. Cochegrus7, Adam Jones8, Monte Johnson,9 Marcel Cochegrus' 0, and 
Maria del Carmen Tirado Sanchez' 1 all provided testimony that the rebar was 
visible, easy to identify, and should have been remedied. 
2R. 580, 12:2-15. R. 588, 22:14-24:17. 
3R. 588, 23 :7- I 2. 
4Mr. Cochegrus's first language is Spanish. He is a native of Queretaro Mexico. See 
R. 324. 
5R. 56 l, 28:7-12. 
6R. 561, 29:21-23. 
7R. 569 
8R. 580, 581 and 583 
9R. 587 
'
0R. 348 
11 R. 547, 624 
5 
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E. 
F. 
Ms. Cochegrus testified landscaping personnel ran over the bar with their 
lawnmowers, and that the lawnmower blades cut the bar. 12 
Adam Jones also testified that the lawnmower blades damaged the bar. Some 
of the damage appeared oxidized. Some of the damage appeared "fresh". 13 
G. Herriman City provided evidence that "Roescrest HOA and ... FCS ... knew 
about the grounding rod ... " 14 
H. Ms. Cochegrus referenced pictures of the grounding rod which demonstrate 
that it was visible. 15 
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to consider all evidence and 
make reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Ms. Cochegrus. 16 The facts, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Cochegrus, justify the reasonable inference that 
Herriman, FCS and Rosecrest had constructive notice of the re bar. In making inferences, the 
Court need not speculate: an "inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact which 
human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other 
facts." I7 Appellee Herriman City references the following useful language: "A reasonable 
12R. 569. 
13R. 580. 
I4R. 593 
15R. 572-575 
16English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
17Heslop v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 UT 5, ,I 22, 390 P.3d 314, 321 (quoting 
Manchester v. Dugan, 247 A.2d 827, 829 (Me. 1968)); See also USA Power, LLC v. 
6 
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inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducting a logical 
consequence from them, while speculation is the act or practice of theorizing about matters 
over which there is no certain knowledge." 18 
If the Court would have considered the "logical consequences" arising from the 
undisputed facts, it would have concluded that the bar existed in a dangerous state for a long 
time. The trial court found that Ms. Cochegrus failed to show "when the city should have had 
constructive notice" of the copper bar and six-inch hole that injured Ms. Cochegrus. 19 This 
was error. 
Proving constructive notice in a premises liability case requires the following: 
(A) that [Defendants] had knowledge of the condition, that is, 
either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the 
condition had existed long enough that he should have 
discovered it; and (8) that after such knowledge, sufficient time 
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care [they] should 
have remedied it. 20 
Rose v. Provo City emphasized that time is not the only factor in finding constructive 
knowledge. 21 The obvious nature of the unsafe condition also plays a role. Referencing a 
litany of older cases, Rose noted that other factors are relevant: 
PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ~ 128-129, 3 72 P .3d 629, 64 7 ( discussing inferences). 
Ul,Winegar v. Springville Ci(v, 2014 UT App 9, ii 20,319 P.3d l (citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
19R. 719. 
20Al!en v. Federated Dai,:F Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975) (emphasis 
added). 
21 Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ii 23, 67 P.3d l O 17, l 020 
7 
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the nature and extent of the defect, its prominence in location 
and otherfactors bearing on what could reasonably be expected 
of a [ defendant].22 
Citing Pollari v. Salt Lake City, Rose emphasized that it is not just the amount of time 
that has elapsed but the "nature," "extent," and "prominence" of the defect that is relevant. 23 
A party will have constructive knowledge of large, obvious dangers in a shorter period of 
time. Small, hidden dangers require longer. This principle is demonstrated in Kreyling v. St. 
George City, where a hole "camouflaged by debris, leaves, and cobwebs" injured a person.24 
The court declined to impute constructive knowledge to the defendant. 
The burden that the plaintiff must meet for constructive notice is not a high one. 
Mingolello v. Megaplex Theaters states that"[ a] court may impute constructive notice only 
when there is some evidence of the length of time the debris has been on the floor. "25 Some 
evidence is all that is necessary-and the evidence must be construed in Ms. Cochegrus' 
favor. Ms. Cochegrus provided "some" evidence of the length of time that the re bar existed 
in an unsafe condition. 
As emphasized by the rule in Rose and Mingolello, the facts show that FCS, Rosecrest 
and Herriman had constructive notice of the bar. The facts show that Ms. Cochegrus was 
221d. ( emphasis added). 
23Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 25, 36, 17 6 P .2d 111, 117 ( 194 7). 
24Kreyling v. St. George City, 2008 UT App 363, * I (memorandum decision). 
252017 UT App 4, iJ 7 (quoting Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, iJ 19, 196 P.3d 576) 
( quotations omitted and emphasis added). 
8 
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injured on April 29, 2012-prior to the summer lawn-mowing season. 26 Adam Jones and 
Monte Johnson testified that the cuts in the bar were likely caused by a lawnmower and that 
the bar was oxidized.27 Mr. Cochegrus saw the bar shortly after the accident. He testified that 
the bar appeared rusted and that it had been hit by a blade or "something."28 Ms. Cochegrus 
also testified that it had been impacted by a lawnmower. 29 
The only reasonable inference from the evidence is that lawn mowing personnel drove 
directly over the rebar, impacted it with their lawn-mowing blades, and left visible dents on 
the rebar prior to the spring of 2012. This likely happened as early as 2006. There is no 
dispute that it had been exposed to the open air for sufficient time to oxidize. The "nature 
and extent" of the hazardous rebar, the fact that it was originally part of the city's lighting 
infrastructure, and its "prominence in location" are all proven in the record. 30 No less than 
five witnesses provided testimony that the rebarwas visible, easy to identify, and should have 
been remedied. 
The Defendants rely heavily on the case of Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co. 31 
Goebel is distinguishable for one important reason - the Court determined that the plaintiffs 
26R. 65, ,r~ 15-16. 
27R. 580, 12:2-15; R. 588, 22:14-24:17. 588, 23:7-121 
28R. 561, 29:21-23. 
29R. 569. 
30R. 542-544, 587, 589; R. 572-575. 
31 2004 UT 80, I 04 P.3d 1185. 
9 
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Hha[ d] offered absolutely no evidence from which a jury could infer the length of time that 
[the railroad] had" notice of a dangerous gap in a railroad track. 32 This case is different 
because a lawnmower ran over the copper bar and damaged it. 
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & light is distinguishable for the same reason - no 
admissible evidence was provided as to the length of time that the unsafe condition existed, 
and no evidence was provided as to how long the utility company had to remedy an unsafe 
condition.33 Ms. Cochegrus has provided evidence that was lacking in Goebel and 
Fishbaugh. An overwhelming amount of evidence is unnecessary, only Hsome" is required. 34 
FCS, Rosecrest and Herriman argue that the bar was not examined by the city until 
months after Ms. Cochegrus' injury. This ignores the evidence because Mr. Cochegrus, Ms. 
Cochegrus and several other witnesses observed oxidation, and lawn-mowing nicks and 
dings shortly after Ms. Cochegrus' injury. Mr. Johnson noted that the bar was oxidized.35 Ms. 
Cochegrus testified that lawn-mowing personnel ran over it shortly after the injury. 36 
FCS, Rosecrest and Herriman also argue that the rebar was not rusted, but that it was 
oxidized, or otherwise rust-colored. Mr. Johnson did not state that the rebar was naturally 
rust-colored, the exchange actually went as follows: 
32/d. at ii 25. 
33969 P.2d 403, 408 (Utah 1998). 
3
-'+Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, ,, 19, 196 P.3d 576. 
35 R. 455, 23:7-12. 
36 R. 569. 
)0 
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Q. (Mr. Parkinson): Okay. The metal up at the top is kind of 
oxidized looking, or rusted looking to some extent or another. 
At least I would describe it that way. Is that a fair way to 
describe it? 
A. (Mr. Johnson): I would say oxidized. I would not say rust. 
It's copper. Copper doesn't rust. 37 
Mr. Johnson correctly stated what copper does when exposed to air- it oxidizes rather 
than rusts. ''Oxidize" is defined as follows: "to combine with oxygen or with more oxygen."38 
Oxidation does not happen overnight. This is a fact understood by common experience. For 
oxidation to appear, the rebar would have needed to be exposed to air for a significant 
amount of time, i.e., the rebar existed in a dangerous condition for a significant amount of 
time. 
It is not speculation to infer the facts in favor of Ms. Cochegrus. In fact the opposite 
is true. FCS, Rosecrest and Herriman 's version of events require some fairly impressive 
mental gymnastics: the re bar suddenly materialized out of the ground after having been safely 
installed in 2006, lawn mowing personnel only started running over it after the accident 
occurred, and despite being plainly visible, no one could see it while mowing the lawn, day-
in-and-day-out, for years and years. These "inferences" are illogical and strain credulity. 
Ms. Cochegrus' conclusions are logical from the facts at hand. The trial court failed 
to make these reasonable and logical inferences as required by Rule 56 and the attendant case 
law. Therefore, this Court should overturn the trial court's decision to grant summary 
judgment. 
37R. 455, 23:7-12. 
38Webster's Third New International Dictionary, "oxidize," page 1613. 
I I 
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II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A TEMPORARY CONDITION VS. 
A PERMANENT CONDITION IS CONFUSING AND SHOULD BE 
REVISED 
Counsel for Ms. Cochegrus conceded that ''[t]hc hazard in this case was, admittedly, 
a temporary condition" during oral argument. 39 This concession was not based on the 
pennanent nature of the copper bar originally installed as part of Herriman City's permanent 
infrastructure. Instead, counsel for Ms. Cochegrus was pigeon-holed into a difficult position 
by existing case law. Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co., and its progeny, hold that 
pennanent installations-like railroad tracks40 and street lights41-are actually temporary unsafe 
~ conditions when they do not continue to work as originally intended. In other cases, lettuce 
leaves which fall on a supermarket floor, and self starting shopping carte are permanent, 
unsafe conditions.42 
The temporary/permanent distinction is confusing. It makes it difficult for lawyers to 
properly advise their clients, and provides uncertain guidance for Judges deciding premises 
liability cases. The Utah Supreme Court should take this opportunity to clarify the law and 
eliminate this confusion. 
In 1996, Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets defined permanent unsafe conditions: 
39R. 555. 
40 Goehel, 2004 UT 80, 104 P .3d 1185 
41 Fishhaugh, 969 P.2d at 405. 
42 Cw?field v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (UT Ct. App. I 992); Carlile v. 
Wal-Mart, 2002 UT App 412, 61 P.3d 287 
12 
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The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a 
permanent nature, such as: in the structure of the building, or of 
a stai1way, etc. or in equipment or machi11e1J1, or in the manner 
<~l use, which was created or chosen by the defendant ( or his 
agents), orfor which he is responsible. In such circumstances, 
where the defendant either created the condition, or is 
responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and no 
further proof of notice is necessary.43 
Under the rule in Schnuphase, a permanent condition is a structure, equipment or a building. 
It may also be the condition of a structure that a property owner creates, chooses, or for 
which he is responsible.44 In theory, this rule seems straightforward. In practice, hardly any 
condition is labeled as"pennanent," even when it fits the above description. 
There are numerous cases that, at first glance, fit the description of a permanent 
condition. For example, cases that involve sidewalks,45 asphalted planter strips,46 street 
lighting,47 sprinkler systems,48 pot holes in parking lots,49 holes in parking strips,50 or railroad 
43Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) (emphasis 
added). 
1998). 
44/d. 
45Kerr v. City of Salt lake, 2013 UT 75, il 2, 322 P.3d 669, 672. 
46Rose, 2003 UT App at ii 15, 67 P.3d at I 022. 
47Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & light, a div. <~/Pac{/icorp, 969 P.2d 403, 403-04 (Utah 
48Porter v. Farmington City Corp., 2014 UT App 12, ~ 6, 318 P.3d 1198, 1200. 
49Johnson v. Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, ,1,13, 18, 206 P.3d 302, 304, 307. 
5
°Kreyling v. St. George City, 2008 UT App 363, * I (memorandum decision). 
13 
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crossings51 are "structure[s], equipment, or machinery." However, in each case, these are 
labeled temporary conditions. If the above-listed conditions are not pennanent stmctures, 
what is? Even more telling is Matheson v. lvlarbec Investments, LLC, which dealt with a 
defective stair in an apartment complex.52 The facts of Matheson fall squarely within the 
language from Schnuphase. The Schnuphase court stated that when a person is "responsible" 
for a "stairway," a defect in the stairway is a permanent, unsafe condition. Then, in 2007, the 
Matheson court decided that a stairway is a temporary unsafe condition following the rule 
in Goebel. The Matheson court did not apply the permanent condition rule from Schnuphase. 
The court stated that defendant was only responsible for "maintenance" of a defective 
stairway.53 
This highlights an additional problem with the temporary/permanent distinction. The 
"for which he is responsible" language from Schnuphase has been rendered useless. Goebel 
v. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co. limited the Hfor which he is responsible" language in 
Schnuphase by stating that a party is not responsible for a condition if the party's 
responsibility is "only in the context of maintenance, and not for its existence in the first 
~ place."54 In Goebel, the plaintiff argued that he was injured because of a gap in the field 
51 Goebel, 2004 UT at ilil 4-6, I 04 P .3d at 1189. 
522007 UT App 363, il 3, I 73 P.3d 199,201. 
·3 
:, Id. aqj 6, 20 I. 
542004 UT at il 20, I 04 P.3d at 1193. 
14 
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panels of a railroad crossing. 55 The court found no notice of the gap because Salt Lake City 
Southern Railroad Company did not create the condition, and therefore was only responsible 
for maintenance. 56 
Goebel and Matheson have eroded the "permanent condition" rule in Schnuphase. 
They have eliminated a property owners duty to maintain property for which he or she takes 
responsibility. To be blunt, Ms. Cochegrus conceded that the bar was a temporary condition 
only because there is no clear understanding of what constitutes a pennanent unsafe 
condition under current Utah law. The Schnuphase rule acknowledged that if a party takes 
responsibility for a condition, notice was not required. 57 In the post Goebel, Fishbaugh and 
Matheson landscape, this is no longer the case. This Court should do away with the 
temporary/permanent distinction and clarify the conflict between Schnuphase and Goebel. 
This recommendation is not without support. Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts states the following: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, 
he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would 
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves 
an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees [. ]58 
55ld.at,I6, 1189. 
56/d. at iJ 20, 1193. 
57Canjield, 841 P.2d at 1226. 
58Restatement (Second) of Torts, §343, Dangerous Condition Known to or 
Discoverable by Possessor ( 1965). 
15 
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A possessor of land is liable if he knows - either through creation, actual knowledge, or 
constructive knowledge-about a dangerous condition. 
Other jurisdictions have adopted the same rule. Kyte v. Mid Hudson Wendico, Inc., 
a New York case, states, "[i]n a premises liability case, a defendant property owner, or a 
party in possession or control of real property, who moves for summary judgment has the 
initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the alleged defective 
condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence."59 
It makes good sense to adopt a standard that requires actual or constructive notice, 
save in the instance when a party created the condition. When a party creates the unsafe 
condition, or sets in motion a method of operation that creates the unsafe conditions, such 
as in Canfield, 60 then no notice would be required. 
Adopting this model would eliminate the confusion surrounding the temporary/ 
pennanent distinction and allow for the analysis to concentrate on creation or notice. While 
the temporary/permanent distinction may have had some validity historically, it now does 
nothing but muddy the water in premises liability cases. It makes more sense to first 
detennine if a defendant created or had notice of the unsafe condition. If a party creates the 
condition, then no notice would be required. If a party did not create the condition, then 
actual or constructive notice would be necessary, and those detenninations would depend on 
59 131 A.D. 3d 452,453 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (emphasis added). 
60 Id. at 227-228. 
16 
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the facts of the case - whether the condition is water on the floor of a grocery store or re bar 
sticking out of the ground. 
In this case, there is ample evidence that Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest had actual 
notice of the copper bar that caused Ms. Cochegrus's injuries. Assuming arguendo that they 
did not have actual notice, knowledge should be imputed to them. As detailed in point I, the 
bar existed long enough and was conspicuous enough for Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest to 
have constructive notice. 
III. ROSECREST ANDFCSHADADUTYTOMAINTAINTHEPARKING 
STRIP. 
Rosecrest and FCS argue that they had no duty to maintain the parking strip. They are 
wrong.61 Herriman Code 7-6-1 places a duty on Rosecrest and FCS. The code states, "[i]t 
shall be the duty of each owner of real property abutting or fronting upon any street, highway 
or alley within the city, to repair and maintain in good condition all public curbs, curb ramps, 
gutters, park strips and sidewalks across or immediately abutting their property."62 There is 
no question that Rosecrest and FCS had a duty "to repair and maintain in good condition" 
the parking strip and to remedy the unsafe condition that injured Ms. Cochegrus. 
61 Herriman City did not argue that it had no duty to maintain the parking strip in its 
appellate brief. 
62Herriman Code 7-6-1. 
17 
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Rosecrest and FCS dispute whether they maintained the parking strip in question. 
There is evidence to the contrary. Adam Jones, who lives in Rosecrest Village,63 stated the 
following in his deposition: 
Q. (Mr Parkinson): Okay. So tell me what you know about who 
mows. 
A. (Mr. Jones): I don't know the company who does our snow 
or our mowing. But from - since I've lived there - which is five 
years - they've mowed the park strip and the lower section, 
which is on the west side of the sidewalk. There's a grassy 
section, then a rock wall, then another grassy section. And 
they've mowed and maintained that whole section. 
Q. Are they the same company that does the interior? 
A. Yes64 
Ms. Cochegrus is entitled to the inference, through the testimony of Adam Jones, that the 
same company that mows the interior of Rosecrest Village maintained the parking strip in 
question. Rosecrest and FCS maintained the grounds of Rosecrest Village and thereby they 
also maintained the parking strip. 
Rosecrest and FCS may not have had the right to cut the rebar or maintain He1Timan 
City's lighting infrastructure, but that hardly is the limit of their options in maintaining the 
parking strip. They could have placed a flag in the ground to warn pedestrians of the location 
of the re bar. They could have called Herriman City and infonned them of the condition, and 
then made sure that Herriman City resolved it. They could have asked Herriman City for 
permission to cut the rebar themselves. They could have spray-painted the rebar a bright 
color so it was more visible. The rebar and the hole were an unsafe condition on the parking 
63R. 408, 19:21-22, 20: 1-9. 
64R. 408, 20: 10-22. 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
strip that Rosecrest and FCS had a statutory duty to maintain. Removal of the re bar was not 
the only option in regards to maintenance. Rosecrest and FCS could have undertaken any 
number of remedies to prevent Ms. Cochegms's injuries. 
Rosecrest and FCS cite Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. for the proposition 
that they have no duty to maintain the parking strip. 65 Hill is distinguishable from Ms. 
Cochegms's case. In Hill, the defendants had no statutory duty to maintain the land at issue. 
In this instance, Herriman City imposes an affirmative duty on abutting landowners to 
maintain the parking strips. Rosecrest owned the abutting land and they hired FCS to 
maintain it. Both had the duty to maintain the parking strip by statute and by contract. In Hill, 
the homeowner' s association ended up settling with the plaintiff since they were not granted 
summary judgment on the issue of whether they owed a duty to the plaintiff.66 The duties of 
the maintenance company, Superior Property Management Services, Inc., did not extend to 
the tree roots that injured the plaintiff in that case and they did not violate its obligations 
under their maintenance contract.67 In this instance, FCS was hired to maintain Rosecrest 
Village's grounds.68 They mowed the parking strip. They had the duty to maintain and 
remove unsafe conditions from the grounds they were maintaining. A person who undertakes 
652013 UT 60, 321 P.3d 1054. 
66/d. at il 7, I 056. 
67 Id. at ilil 2, 6-7, 1055-56. 
68 R. 616-617 
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the task of maintaining another person's property is liable for negligence despite the fact that 
he or she does not own it.69 
Herriman City imposed an affirmative duty on Rosecrest and FCS to maintain the 
parking strip. The deposition of Adam Jones supports the inference that they did maintain 
that area. Accordingly, Rosecrest and FCS had a duty to maintain the parking strip and 
protect against unsafe conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Third District Court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed. Ms. 
Cochegrus is entitled to reasonable inferences in her favor from the evidence provided. The 
distinction of permanent and temporary conditions should be overturned and replaced with 
a creation and notice standard. Additionally, the evidence supports an inference that the 
Defendants had notice of the rusty rebar and six-inch hole. All the Defendants had a duty to 
remedy the unsafe condition and are liable for the injuries it caused. Summary judgment 
should be reversed and this case remanded to the District Court. 
69See e.g. Salt lake City v. Schubach, United Pac. Ins. Co., Intervener, 108 Utah 266, 
274, 159 P.2d 149, 152 ( 1945) 
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